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Abstract
In the last three decades, two questions have been central for the Left. Is there a future for electoral
socialism and social democracy? And, is it any longer possible to promote a signicant redistribution
of income in favour of labour? Political and economic events seem to suggest negative answers. In his
inuential work, Adam Przeworski suggests that this is an irreversible trend that makes it impossible
in the long-run to promote genuinely socialist objectives in capitalist democracies. In particular, the
structural dependence of labour on capital severely constrains feasible income distributions. In this
paper, a detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of the post-war UK economy is provided which
casts doubts on the structural dependence thesis. A short run prot-squeeze mechanism seems to
exist, but income shares are more variable than the structural dependence argument suggests, and the
power resources available to the two main classes in the economy are among the key determinants of
distributive outcomes, di¤erent political-economic equilibria corresponding to di¤erent congurations
of the balance of power between the two classes.
JEL Classication:
D33 - Factor Income Distribution;
E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles;
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining
Keywords: social democracy, income distribution, structural dependence thesis.
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1 Introduction
In the last three decades, two questions have been central in both scholarly analyses and political
debates on the labour movement and the Left. Is there a future for social democracy? And, is it
any longer possible to promote a signicant redistribution of income in favour of labour (whether
through government policies from above or class struggle from below, or some combination of the
two)? Political and economic events, both in national and international contexts, suggest negative
answers. Even when parties of the Left have been electorally successful, this has been at the cost of
such a signicant revision of their traditional programme and rhetoric that they have abandoned many
of their traditional egalitarian commitments in favour of market solutions supported by a rhetoric of
choice, and have promoted policies with only limited redistributive e¤ects.
A rigorous analysis of why this has happened has been proposed by Adam Przeworski ([50], [53],
[54]). According to Przeworski, there is an irreversible tendency that makes it impossible in capitalist
democracies in the long-run to promote a signicant redistribution of income, let alone any socialist
objectives. Indeed, the era of electoral socialism may be over (Przeworski [53], p.185). His main
arguments can be summarized as follows.
In the political arena, socialist and social democratic parties are doomed to fail. Once social-
ist parties opt for electoral rather than extra-parliamentary strategies, socialist aims are inevitably
abandoned, because the electoral road to socialism is impossible in the long-run. Workers (narrowly
dened as "manual wage-earners employed in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, and
agriculture, persons retired from such occupations, and inactive adult members of their households",
Przeworski [50], p.104) have never been the majority of the electorate and their proportion shows a
secular decline. If however socialist parties choose class-alliance strategies, they face a trade-o¤: they
may attract white collar voters but only at the cost of part of their working-class electorate. Further,
the e¤ects of such decisions tend to persist over time and to constrain future choices.
In the economic arena, Przeworski ([50]) rejects the standard Marxist view that the interests of
workers and capitalists are diametrically opposed, both in short-run struggles over income distribution,
and in the longer run struggle for a socialist transformation. According to him, the standard Marxist
view is in striking contrast to the passivity of the working class in developed capitalist countries, a
passivity born of acceptance of, if not active support for, the capitalist system. He rejects explanations
of this phenomenon in terms of ideology, supposing instead that workers and their organisations are
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rational, self-interested, forward-looking utility maximizers. He argues that the interests of capitalists
and workers are indeed in conict in the short-run: higher prots lead to lower wages, and vice-versa.
This is not true in a dynamic context however, because in a capitalist system prots are the engine of
growth, and growth delivers (at least potentially) higher welfare in the future. It is this mechanism
that is the material basis of workersconsent to capitalism and thus of capitalist hegemony, since it
explains why, faced with the likely high costs of transition to socialism, self-interested rational workers
will support capitalism because of its promise of continued welfare growth.
Further, when socialist parties forsake revolutionary strategies, they inevitably enter into an eco-
nomic logic of class compromise. For to gain the future benet of the returns to investment, they
must forego any signicant expropriation of prots today.1 Both high levels of taxation imposed by
a sympathetic government and the promotion of working-class militancy through class struggle are
counterproductive, because each will generate a prot-squeeze mechanism: low prots lead to a re-
duction in investment, which implies lower employment today and lower production and wages in the
future. Signicant changes in the distribution of income, either via a welfare state or via bargaining
and conict are severely constrained.2 The working class is therefore structurally dependent upon
capital, and the argument summarized as the structural dependence thesis(henceforth, SDT).
Przeworskis theory is extremely inuential, and his conclusions have been widely debated. It
is di¢ cult to underestimate the theoretical and policy implications of the idea that the structural
features of private ownership economies severely constrain the range of attainable distributions of
income. Przeworski has provided one of the most sophisticated analysis of SDT, but the basic idea
has a long history and it is shared by a large number of authors belonging to very di¤erent traditions,
from neo-Marxist schools to neoclassical economics (classic contributions include O¤e [47], Lindblom
[41], Peltzman [48], Becker [4], Bates and Lien [3]). It also lies at the heart of neoliberal approaches and
provides the foundations for criticisms of social democratic parties, the welfare state, and Keynesian
policies. Further, SDT has strongly inuenced policy debates and the elaboration of actual political
programmes. For example, in a series of papers, Wickham-Jones ([70], [71]) has forcefully shown that
1For a more recent development of Przeworskis analysis of the income distributions consistent with democratic
capitalism, see Benhabib and Przeworski ([5]): although the analysis is framed in terms of rich vs. poor the main thrust
of the argument is similar to his earlier work.
2Przeworski and Wallerstein ([54]) analyse a slightly di¤erent version of the two-class model and show that any
attempts to redistribute income trigger a prot-squeeze. It is true that once in o¢ ce, left-wing governments can in
principle redistribute welfare via increasing taxes on capitalists consumption. But rational capitalists will anticipate
this policy, reduce investment, and cause an economic crisis. Hence, the state may be structurally dependent in
the dynamic sense that, given costs of anticipations, left-wing governments may best promote the interests of their
constituencies by assuring capitalists that they would not pursue such policies (Przeworski [52], p.95).
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from around 1990 onwards the UK Labour Party (in opposition) formulated policy programmes on
the basis of a belief in SDT. Subsequently in government, its infatuation with the nancial sector
could be interpreted in the same light.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the relevance of the issues raised, and the widespread belief in SDT,
there is little empirical evidence that denitively supports the idea that income distribution in capi-
talist economies is severely constrained. Indeed, empirical analyses of SDT are few and inconclusive.
Existing studies focus in the main on redistributive policies by governments in order to ascertain the
existence of limits to government policies either by examining di¤erences in choices under di¤erent
governments,3 or by considering the limiting cases of governments elected with radical programmes
(e.g., Allendes Chile or Manleys Jamaica). According to Przeworski and Wallerstein ([54]), such
empirical analyses of SDT are neither informative nor satisfactory because they cannot speak to the
issue of limits and possibilities(Przeworski and Wallerstein [54], p.14). On the one hand, di¤erences
in policies would not prove much about the existence of structural constraints that bind all govern-
ments. We cannot know whether the observed di¤erences exhaust the realm of possibility (ibid.).
On the other hand, the issue of possibilities cannot be determined on the basis of limited historical
experience(ibid.).
Those doubts about empirical tests of SDT that cannot distinguish between actual and possible
choices are cogent. Trying to test choices generally involves counterfactual statements about what
could have been done, and these are notoriously di¢ cult to pin down. The di¢ culty is in determining
whether and how structural constraints on choices are binding: whether and how the constraints on
redistribution are so tight that neither government nor unions can do very much, and rational actors
knowing this do not do very much.
Yet to move from these problems to advocating a purely theoretical analysis of SDT, by con-
structing a formal model with which the internal logic of the theory can be explored (Przeworski
and Wallerstein [54], p.14) is both doubtful and unwarranted. It is doubtful because while SDT is a
theoretical construct to explain the empirical world, Przeworski and Wallersteins claim suggests that
it cannot be subjected to empirical scrutiny. Taken literally, this claim would place SDT into the
realm of metaphysics. It is unwarranted because the examination of isolated historical episodes and
of government choices does not exhaust the content of possible empirical tests. Indeed, Swank notes
3For a survey of the older literature, see Camerons ([11]) classic study. More recent contributions include King and
Wickham-Jones ([32]), Swank ([64]), Wickham-Jones ([70]).
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that although limiting cases of radical redistributive policies are interesting, it is the more routine
political-economic interactions that serve as a crucial test of the generalized form of the structural
dependence thesis(Swank [64], p.39).
While most authors focus on the set of political claims above concerning the electoral fate of so-
cialist parties and the existence (and severity) of electoral trade-o¤s (Esping-Andersen [17], Sainsbury
[61], Koelble [35], Kitschelt [34]), this paper focuses on the set of economic claims, and in particular
on the feasible distributive outcomes that the labour movement may reach within a capitalist econ-
omy. It analyses the core claims of SDT empirically, focusing on the causal link from distribution to
employment, and investigates whether there is indeed a basic distributive trade-o¤ and what its char-
acteristics are. In order to circumvent the above objections, the empirical analysis proposed does not
focus on actual or possible choices of the actors in the economy, but tries to trace the e¤ects of struc-
tural dependence on income distribution. In particular, if SDT is correct and relevant, the range of
income distributions attainable in advanced capitalist democracies should be narrowly circumscribed
and the economy should gravitate around some tightly determined equilibrium. No government ...
can reduce the share of income that owners of capital consume. Any additional income for wage
earners, whether it consists of wage gains won at the bargaining table or as transfer payments won
through election, reduces total investment, dollar for dollar(Przeworski and Wallerstein [54], p.16,
emphasis added). Attempts to redistribute income should therefore only yield short-run, temporary
e¤ects. Two issues are thus of considerable interest in evaluating SDT: rst, whether there has in
fact empirically been a prot squeeze mechanism of the sort postulated by Przeworski; second, the
behaviour of long-run income distribution.
Section 2 lays out the framework of our empirical approach in detail and presents the empirical
evidence. Instead of evaluating whether policy choices co-vary with the partisan orientation of cabinets
in a cross-sectional context, we analyse the dynamics of distributive conict by focusing on the time
series of post-war UK data in order to understand the behaviour of pre-tax income distribution.
Further, unlike in the rest of the empirical literature on SDT, we draw a fundamental distinction
between short-run dynamics and long-run tendencies.
Two main stylised facts emerge from the analysis of the postwar UK data. First, evidence is
presented in favour of the short-run prot-squeeze mechanism postulated by Przeworski. At any
given point in time, attempts to alter the distribution of income in favour of labour do seem to trigger
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a classic prot-squeeze mechanism. Second, and more important, however, the long-run distribution
of income is much more variable than is implied by SDT, which problematizes its core idea that the
structural features of private ownership and private investment decisions severely constrain the set of
feasible distributions.
Section 2 focuses on all employees and this may be deemed unsatisfactory: SDT concerns the wage
share as a class share, but aggregate employee compensation comprises all labour income, including
that of top executives. While only limited data exists for the UK economy that distinguish di¤erent
categories of employees, section 3 presents the empirical evidence for manual workers in production
industries. The pattern of the data is strikingly similar to that for all employees: over the period
1974-1993, short-run cycles are visible (and match those of all employees) around a sharply declining
trend.
In the light of these stylised facts, the main challenge for Przeworski is to provide an explanation
of the behaviour of long-run income distribution consistent with the key insights of SDT. But section
4 argues that there is no such explanation of the long-run in Przeworski, and the prot-squeeze mech-
anism is consistent with an innity of equilibrium income distributions. Not only that, it is unclear
that a satisfactory explanation of the evolution of long-run distributive shares could be provided which
would be consistent with SDT. For this would require a theory of long-run changes driven (entirely or
mostly) by forces that are completely independent of distributive conict (such as exogenous technical
change or some Malthusian population mechanism). Theoretically, this would imply the endorsement
of the crudest economic determinism that Przeworski himself has repeatedly and convincingly criti-
cized (see, in particular, Przeworski [50], [51]). But the analysis developed in sections 4 and 6 suggests
that this is also empirically doubtful, and an econometric investigation of the UK data conrms the
main interpretive hypotheses of this paper.
Contrary to the key tenets of SDT, we suppose that the power resources available to the two main
classes in the economy are among the key determinants of distributive outcomes, di¤erent political-
economic equilibria corresponding to di¤erent congurations of the balance of power between the two
classes (Korpi [36], [37], [38], Korpi and Shalev [40], Esping-Andersen [17], Bradley et al. [8], Korpi
and Palme [39]). Section 5 introduces the power resources approach, and outlines the variables on
which we have chosen to concentrate. Then, in section 6, a vector error correction model (henceforth,
VECM) is used to investigate the short-run and long-run dynamics of income distribution. While there
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is evidence of the existence of short-run prot squeeze cycles consistent with the analysis in section
2, the VECM also shows that there is a robust long-run relation between distributive outcomes and
two variables capturing some key power resources of the two classes, namely trade union density and
an index of capital mobility. Hence, a prot-squeeze mechanism may be operating at any given time,
but to infer from this an economic dynamic whereby prots provide the basis for future increases
in well-being is much more problematic as an explanation of the material basis for workersconsent
to capitalism. For there is no obvious long-run equilibrium value of income shares, suggesting that
whatever underlying mechanism is at work, it is too unstable to drive the workersconsent required
by SDT. This suggests that Przeworskis mechanism is of empirically limited signicance.
To be sure, it may be argued that our variables are only imperfect proxies of the power resources
available to the main classes. Further, as Pencavel has noted, the perennial problem with issues
in labor relations is in unscrambling causal relationships where the key forcing variables are often
unmeasured or poorly measured([49], p.183). Thus, although the econometric evidence presented in
section 6 is strong, and the results robust to a number of specications of the model, Section 7 develops
a qualitative analysis of our key theoretical relations that supports our quantitative results. Our focus
on a single country allows us to outline a concise but focused historical account of the changing
conditions of class struggle in the postwar UK economy, which forcefully shows the importance of
institutional, political, legislative and even cultural factors in determining long-run changes in the
balance of power of the two classes, and of income distribution.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that, although the main focus of the paper is SDT, our
analysis also provides novel empirical support for the power resources approach and the relevance
of class. For it suggests that the power resources available to the two main classes in the economy
are among the key determinants of distributive outcomes. Indeed our paper provides an innovative
contribution: unlike virtually all of the empirical literature on the power resources approach (Bradley
et al. [8]), we focus on the determinants of (pre-tax) distributive outcomes, rather than of social
spending (and redistributive policies), and we take a time-series rather than cross-national perspective,
which allows us to distinguish more clearly two types of e¤ects of power resources and class conict:
the short-run e¤ect on market distribution and the long-run e¤ect of changes in the balance of power
on the conditions for market distribution.
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2 Distribution and conict in the postwar UK: stylised facts
The theoretical framework of our empirical analysis is based on a stylised account of class conict
over distributive shares in the process of capitalist accumulation. Investment increases employment,
which in turn increases the bargaining strength of the working class, and increases the wage share in
value added. The corresponding falling prot share reduces investment, hence employment and hence
the bargaining strength of the working class. This recreates the protability conditions necessary
for renewed accumulation, investment rises, and the cycle repeats. This is the mechanism originally
analysed by Przeworski ([50]) and it can be considered as the canonical model of the prot squeeze
cycle underlying SDT.4
There are, of course, many possible ways of formalizing this mechanism by considering specic
causal links between the variables, thus deriving specic versions of the prot squeeze cycle.5 In what
follows, however, we do not wish to analyse empirically a specic formalization of the SDT and so we
keep our analysis at the most general level. Indeed, the stylised account above is su¢ cient to formulate
our hypotheses. It identies the two key variables of the analysis, the wage share and the employment
rate, and it postulates a cyclical relation between them.6 A scatter plot of the employment rate
(on the vertical axis) against the wage share (on the horizontal axis), with scatter points considered
sequentially in time, should generate a clockwise path if it is to represent a prot squeeze mechanism
of the sort postulated by Przeworski. In the wage share (WS) employment rate (ER) space, we call
these clockwise movements WSER cycles.
Thus a rst simple test of SDT can be formulated: if Przeworskis thesis is empirically valid, the
data should show either a stable equilibrium income distribution (possibly with random deviations),
or at most a stable cycle around the equilibrium. The former pattern would emerge in the absence of
attempts to redistribute (because for example of an awareness of the prot-squeeze mechanism); the
latter would derive from attempts to redistribute income by trade unions or social democratic parties
when in power.
We use the UK as our case study. As a canonical example of a liberal market economy (Hall
4The model used by Przeworski and Wallerstein ([54]) is not adequate to analyse SDT and its prot squeeze mech-
anism. It is a growth model with little scope for cycles; it analyzes neither the labour market, nor the e¤ect of labour
market conditions on income distribution; it is a two-class model but with no bargaining theoretic framework.
5An elegant and inuential model in this framework was proposed by Goodwin ([20]), with the wage share and the
employment rate moving cyclically in conservative oscillations with a xed period.
6While our focus on the wage share is motivated by our interest in the determinants of income distribution between
classes, and on the conictual dimension of their interaction as postulated by SDT, this does not imply that all aspects
of the relations between employers and employees should be viewed as a zero-sum conict (Wright [73], Korpi [38]).
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Figure 1: Employment Rate Against Wage Share, UK, 1950-2010
and Soskice [25], Korpi [38]), and given the inuence of SDT on policy-making mentioned above, the
UK should be an excellent test for the theory; indeed, it is so analysed in much of the literature on
Przeworski (King and Wickham-Jones [32], Wickham-Jones [70], [71]). In exploring the empirics of
WSER cycles in the UK, and their bearing on SDT, it is obviously desirable to obtain as long a run
of data as possible; and so, we examine the period 1950-2010.7 The wage share variable is the ratio
of total employee compensation to the sum of total employee compensation and the gross operating
surplus of the whole economy, all pre-tax, a proxy for the ratio of wages to the sum of wages and
prots. The employment rate variable is the ratio of employee jobs to the sum of workforce jobs and
claimant count unemployment.8 These data have much longer time series than the more appropriate
employment rate derived from the Labour Force Survey, and we use them for that reason. But this
makes no di¤erence to our conclusions.
In the case of the UK since World War II (1950-2010), a plot of annual data is shown as Figure
1. On the face of it, this evidence is not encouraging for the Przeworski thesis: there is no tightly
determined income distribution and the wage share is rather variable, a well-known empirical nding
(Boggio et al. [6]). Although the data do not accurately describe a uniform prot-squeeze cycle either,
some have interpreted them as describing an erratic long-run cycle (see for example Flaschel et al.
[18]). This interpretation is unconvincing: (three quarters of) a cycle is not a periodic motion and
moreover if a prot squeeze mechanism is at work, it is quite unlikely to operate on such an extended
7Data sources are given in Appendix A.
8Note that our denition of the employment rate is an employee-employment-rate. Because it excludes the self-
employed, subtracting it from 100 does not measure the unemployment rate.
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time scale. Besides, this would not rescue SDT: if protability is only restored after some 60 years,
worker gains can hardly be considered ephemeral.
An alternative interpretation of the empirical evidence allows us to provide a renement of SDT:
the data describe a number of short-run cycles that are subject to continual displacement. Indeed
Veneziani and Mohun ([68]) have suggested that in the analysis of WSER cycles, a clear distinction be
drawn between the long-run and the short-run. In the long-run, the wage share and the employment
rate vary because of long-run processes such as technical change, institutional reforms, etc. that
continually modify the balance of power between classes and the structure of the bargaining process.
The WSER cycles are then the shorter run cycles that appear around the long-run motion, and are
subject to continual displacement as the bargaining environment and the balance of class forces evolves.
This interpretation is more in line with intuition and with the operation of a prot squeeze mechanism.
Therefore we can reformulate our conjecture more precisely, by stating that if Przeworskis theory is
valid, rst, stable short-run WSER cycles should be visible in the uctuations of the data, and second,
most of the variability in the data should derive from these short-run uctuations around (reasonably)
constant long-run values of the two variables
In order to evaluate SDT in these terms, we lter the data to distinguish between short-run
uctuations and long-run changes. Figure 2 illustrates short-run cycles for the whole post-war period.
The variables are dened as in Figure 1, with the wage share on the horizontal and the employment
rate on the vertical axis, but the labels are omitted for visual convenience. For each variable, the axes
measure the percentage points di¤erence between the raw data and its trend value, determined using
locally weighted scatterplot smoothing, a robust algorithm that is not sensitive to outliers.9 Several
features are noteworthy. First, the data do indeed describe a repetitive cyclical process. There is only
one exception: the data for 1983-86 do not describe a cycle at all. Second, although it is not obvious
visually, the movements are always clockwise, as the prot squeeze cycle hypothesis requires (again
with the exception of 1983-86). Third, the cycles are variable in both amplitude and periodicity.
Indeed, it is obvious that the (stop-go) period up to the late 1960s is characterised by cycles of much
shorter amplitude and periodicity than the subsequent period (the end of the post-war boom, the
9For a thorough discussion of this loessprocedure, see Cleveland [15]. None of the results in this paper depends
on data ltering in general, or on the specic lter used. Although lters sometimes produce spurious cycles (Canova
[12]), all of the ndings on WSER cycles are robust to the smoothing procedure adopted: neither the existence nor the
qualitative features of short-run cycles depend on the use of loess and very similar results can be obtained by using a
Hodrick and Prescott lter or P-spline regression. Indeed, the short-run cycles can be seen also in the raw data and
ltering only makes them clearer. The results with the Hodrick-Prescott lter can be obtained from the authors upon
request. Flaschel et al. ([18]) provide a thorough empirical analysis of WSER cycles using P-spline regressors.
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Figure 2: WSER Cycles as Deviations from Trend, UK, 1950-2010
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Figure 3: Level and Trend: Wage Share and Employment Rate, UK, 1950-2010
neoliberal revolution, globalisation and the growth of nancialization).10
These ndings are consistent with the operation of a prot-squeeze mechanism at any given point
in time. The cycles depicted are by no means perfect, but they are suggestive of an interpretation
of the Przeworski thesis, concerning the impossibility of signicant redistributions of income. Indeed,
the WSER cycles depicted in Figure 2 perhaps help to explain the widespread popularity of the SDT.
In line with the basic intuitions of the SDT, at any given point in time, an increase in the share
of national income going to workers triggers a prot squeeze, which restores protability reasonably
quickly, after an increase in unemployment weakens workersbargaining power.
While the existence of a short-run prot squeeze may explain the intuitive purchase of SDT, this
evidence provides only a partial picture of distributive conict. As noted above, the SDT is not
just about short-run trade-o¤s: it is a theory of the constraints on feasible long term equilibrium
distributions. The variations in the long-run values of the wage share and the employment rate are
shown in Figure 3, which illustrates the timepath and its trend for each variable. From 1950 to the
mid-70s, the mean equilibrium wage share was 70.8% and the mean equilibrium employment rate was
88.2%. We interpret the short-run WSER cycles depicted above as moving along a long-run trend,
and it is this trend that has to be interpreted by SDT, for visual inspection shows that these long
run trends are not even approximately horizontal straight lines. Thus, whereas the analysis of short-
run motions lends some support to the existence of a short run prot-squeeze mechanism, the set of
attainable equilibrium values of the wage share and employment rate are all but limited, even after
10 Interestingly, the cycles are temporally related to growth cycles in (constant price) GDP measured from peak to
peak, but the relation is only approximate.
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all temporary and cyclical movements have been eliminated.
But before we examine the long run dynamics directly, there is a further issue. It may be objected
that SDT concerns the wage share as a class share, and that is not what is depicted in Figures 1, 2 and
3. Employee compensation is just that; it includes the labour income of the highest paid industrial and
nancial executives on the same basis as the labour income of the most lowly paid unskilled worker.
Ideally, a much narrower denition of wage share would be appropriate to throw light on SDT (recall
Przeworskis narrow denition of the working class, cited above), and the next Section considers this
further.
3 Disentangling the wage share
Unfortunately, only very limited data exists for the UK economy that precisely distinguishes di¤erent
categories of employees. Census of Production data provide a continuous series for Manufacturing for
the years 1971-1995, and for the Production Industries (Mining, Manufacturing and Utilities) for the
years 1974-1995. Data is reported on wages paid to manual workers and value added, and hence a
manual worker wage share can be constructed. But there is no analogous sectoral employment rate,
and so we have to assume that the employment rate used in Figures 1 and 2 above can be used as a
proxy for that of Production industries. This is di¢ cult because of the secular decline of employment
in Production industries. With that caveat, if WSER cycles can be found for the economy as a whole,
then one would expect them to exist in Production industries (whose manual workers are a major
component of Przeworskis denition of the working class).11
We apply the same methodology to the raw data and derive some surprising conclusions. First,
using the same periodization as in Figure 2, Figure 4 displays the deviations from trend of the wage
share in net output of manual workers in Production industries (horizontal axis) plotted against the
deviations from trend of the national employment rate (dened as before, and on the vertical axis).
The pattern in Figure 4 is strikingly similar to that in Figure 2, and it does show some support for
the existence of the short-run mechanism at the heart of SDT. If one focuses on the core segment of
the working class, any attempt at altering the income distribution seems to trigger a prot squeeze in
the short-run, as predicted by SDT.
11For the US economy data exist which distinguish employees with no supervisory responsibilities from those with
supervisory responsibilities. The wage share of the former alone provides a closer proxy for the theoretical wage share
required to investigate the existence of a prot-squeeze mechanism in WSER cycles. The analysis of the US economy
in Mohun and Veneziani ([46]), however, yields qualitatively similar conclusions to those derived here.
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Figure 4: WSER Cycles as Deviation from Trend, UK Production Industries, Manual Workers, 1974-
1995
However, the long-run analysis of the behaviour of the income share of the core of the working
class conrms, indeed further strengthens the doubts on the empirical validity of SDT discussed above.
For the short-run equilibrium values, the centres of the WSER cycles, around which the wage share
and the rate of employment uctuate, vary signicantly over time, and there is a very sharp long-run
trend in the manual wage share data in Production industries, as illustrated in Figure 5. It should
be noted that this variation in wage share is not attributable to the considerable relative decline in
Production industries in the UK between 1971 and 1995. For both wages and value added are dened
with respect to Production industries, and hence a relative decline in the totals should make no
di¤erence. What should be noted is the changing proportion of manual workers to total employment
within Production industries, which falls from 72.6% in 1974 to 65.3% in 1995, perhaps an e¤ect of
capital-using labour-saving technical progress.
In summary, the empirical analyses in this section and in the previous one identify two key stylised
facts about income distribution and distributive conict. There is indeed evidence of a short-run prot
squeeze mechanism as predicted by SDT, but the data also show signicant variability in long-run
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Figure 5: Manual Wage Share in Value Added, Production Industries, UK, 1974-1995
income distribution that is prima facie inconsistent with SDT. Thus the question arises as to whether
a satisfactory explanation of this empirical evidence can be provided which is broadly consistent
with a rened version of SDT, and with Przeworskis methodological commitments. This question is
addressed in the next section.
4 SDT and the long-run dynamics of income distribution
Recall Przeworskis remark No government ... can reduce the share of income that owners of capital
consume. Any additional income for wage earners, whether it consists of wage gains won at the
bargaining table or as transfer payments won through election, reduces total investment, dollar for
dollar (Przeworski and Wallerstein [54], p.16, emphasis added). But while the empirical evidence
shows the existence of a growth/distribution trade-o¤operating at any given point of time, as predicted
by SDT, it also shows that the trade-o¤ itself is moving over time. The determination of the longer-run
distributive equilibria of capitalist economies is therefore a signicant issue.
Does Przeworskis approach provide an explanation of the long-run? Przeworski ([50], p.43) posits
a prot squeeze mechanism whereby if prots are not su¢ cient then eventually wages or employment
must fall. Lacking a proper denition of su¢ cientprots, however, the explanatory power of his
mechanism is limited. Let P e be a measure of capitalistsexpected or normalprots. Przeworskis
analysis is consistent with an innity of values of P e and thus, in the absence of an explanation of
P e, is at best underdetermined. This would not be (too) problematic if prots were found empirically
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to vary within a reasonably narrow range, but given the signicant variability of equilibrium income
shares, the theoretically and empirically interesting issue is precisely the determination of P e, as the
product of social, political, and economic conditions, past and present government policies, etc. But
this is lacking in Przeworskis SDT there is no long-run argument.
Can Przeworskis approach provide a satisfactory explanation of the long-run consistent with the
fundamental insights of SDT? SDT could be (partly) rescued if it could be shown that the long-run
changes were driven (entirely or mostly) by forces that are completely independent of class conict
and distributive policies.
Theoretically, it is very di¢ cult to nd some long-run explanatory mechanism that is completely
independent of distributive conict. This would require the identication of some explanatory variables
that are not inuenced (directly or indirectly) by class struggle and government policies, and have
no e¤ect on the latter. Yet even long-run changes in the institutional and legislative framework, the
cultural and education system, and the basic structural features of the economy (including long-run
trends in technological progress, labour supply, skills, and so on) are hardly independent of distributive
conict and government policies. For the major political and economic actors struggle not just to place
the economy in a di¤erent point along a given growth/distribution trade o¤ but to alter the trade o¤
itself. The idea of identifying some completely exogenous explanatory variables is unconvincing in that
it would imply the endorsement of the crudest form of economic determinism, which Przeworski himself
has repeatedly and convincingly rejected. Indeed, an explanation of long-run income distribution and
the limits to class conict based only on exogenous variables would be inconsistent with Przeworskis
broader approach to classes and class struggle.
As Przeworski has forcefully argued, structural constraints on individual choice and the social
determination of agents are central in the analysis of class. The conception of undi¤erentiated, un-
changing, and unrelated individuals(Przeworski [51], p.381) typical of rational choice theory is both
unsatisfactory and unrealistic, and the structural features shaping agentsinteraction (in the economic
or political arena) and their preferences and beliefs have a key explanatory relevance. The appro-
priate view is neither one of two ready-to-act classes nor of abstract individuals, but of individuals
who are embedded in di¤erent types of relations with other individuals within a multidimensionally
described social structure (ibid., p.393). Further, Przeworski emphasises the role of politics and
culture in the formation of classes as collective actors. Classes must thus be viewed as e¤ects of
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struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political and ideologi-
cal(Przeworski [50], p.47). Therefore the process of class formation is a perpetual one: classes are
continually organized, disorganized, and reorganized(ibid., p.71).
It is di¢ cult to underestimate the relevance of structural constraints (and changes in the political,
economic and institutional framework) and endogenous preferences (and thus ideological struggle) in
the analysis of long-run political-economic processes and policy formation. Indeed, based on Prze-
worskis own theory of class and class conict, long-run changes in the structural features of class
conict (produced by the voluntary or involuntary e¤ects of agentsactions), and shifts in hegemony
should be focal in the analysis of distributive struggles. For political and class struggles are not just
about choosing the optimal position in a given structure of trade-o¤s, but rst and foremost about
altering those trade-o¤s themselves, by creating the conditions for changes in structural constraints
and for shifts in hegemony. As Rothstein ([60], p.35) forcefully puts it, institutions are created with
the object of giving the agent ... an advantage in the future game of power. It is these long-run forces
that are arguably central to understanding the dynamics of class struggle and income distribution in
advanced capitalist countries.12
For there are continuous changes in the economic and institutional framework that are at least
partly endogenously produced by class struggles: labour market regulations, technical change, global-
isation, etc. [P]ower relations and institutional rules ... are themselves shaped by class processes and
class conicts (Wright [74], p.110). These structural features a¤ect the rights and powers accom-
panying private ownership of the means of production(ibid., p.111) and the boundaries of feasible
income distributions within the capitalist system, and tend to change over time and across national
boundaries. For example, in most European countries after 1945 the absence of a viable exit strat-
egy implied that immobile productive capital had to opt for voice within corporatist institutions;
the absence of exit created the same incentives for [the social-democratic] compromise as workers
reliance on capitalist investment for future wages(Schwartz [63], p.258). In the 1980s and 1990s, the
increased international mobility of capital, the deregulation of labour markets, more restrictive union
legislation, and the decrease of revenue ows necessary to provide a high social wage have weakened
labours position in the economy and altered the range of feasible income distributions against it
12There is robust historical evidence that political actors intentionally act to modify the structural and institutional
features of the economy in order to change the balance of power between classes (Rothstein [60], Korpi [38]). Such
changes are generally associated with shifts in hegemony, the product of the battle of ideas (King and Ross [33],
Roemer [59]).
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(Korpi and Palme [39]).
By implicitly taking a short-run perspective, Przeworski has analysed income distribution in ad-
vanced economies in models in which institutions (except for private property and private investment
decisions) play no role and agentss preferences are exogenously given.13 The explanatory power of
this approach is limited, as the empirical analysis in section 2 above shows, and as Przeworskis own
theory of class suggests, for complex structural and subjective factors are central in determining the
equilibrium of the economy. Przeworskis own general claims on the importance of hegemony, endoge-
nous preferences, and culture on the one hand, and on social structures and structural constraints,
on the other hand, forcefully show the shortcomings of his theoretical approach to distributive strug-
gles. In particular, they cast doubt on the idea that income distribution in advanced economies can
be derived deductively in an abstract model which assumes only the institution of private property
together with instrumentally rational agents with given, exogenous preferences.
It is therefore theoretically di¢ cult to nd a long-run explanatory mechanism for income distribu-
tion independent of class struggle. By contrast, the following sections focus on power resources and on
the e¤ect of changes in the balance of power over long-run distributive outcomes to show empirically
that plausible mechanisms do exist that are precisely not independent of power relations and class
struggle.
5 Power, conict and distribution
We have argued that the data on income distribution in the postwar UK economy provide prima facie
evidence against SDT: a prot-squeeze mechanism seems to operate at any given point in time (which
might explain the widespread intuitive appeal of SDT), but the long-run distribution of income is
much more variable than SDT allows for. We have also argued that there is no explanation of the
long-run in Przeworskis theory, and we have raised some doubts about the possibility that a robust
theoretical model of the long-run evolution of income distribution can be provided that is consistent
with SDT. Indeed, Przeworskis general theory of class forcefully suggests that an alternative approach
to SDT is necessary to explain long-run trends in income distribution in capitalist economies.
13The prot-squeeze mechanism is produced by the actions of two ready-to-act classes which are perfect agents
of abstract individuals with exogenously given preferences. The social structure is in no way multidimensionally
described. This might be justied as a mere methodological simplication aimed at separating the analysis of action
at a particular moment from everything that created the conditions under which this action occurs (Przeworski [51],
p.385). It leads, however, to a tension in his approach, as argued by Veneziani ([66]; see also [65], [67])
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In the rest of the paper, we develop an empirical analysis of the existence of a short-run prot
squeeze mechanism and the long-run variability of the political-economic equilibrium of the UK econ-
omy. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive explanation of the determinants of the wage share
and the employment rate, which have been the subject of a vast debate (for a recent survey, see
Boggio et al. [6]), let alone the determinants of earnings inequality (for a discussion see Bradley et
al. [8]). Rather, our purpose is to provide further evidence on the limits of SDT and to outline the
foundations of an alternative interpretation of the long-run movement of distributive shares which
emphasises changes in the bargaining power of social classes as one of the key determinants of the
political-economic equilibrium of capitalist economies. To be specic, contrary to the key tenets of
SDT, we suppose that the power resources available to the two main classes in the economy are
among the key determinants of distributive outcomes, and di¤erent equilibria correspond to di¤erent
congurations of the balance of power between the two classes.14
There is a long standing tradition in social theory that provides robust theoretical foundations
for the idea that the power resources of the working class in the economic and political spheres are
among the key determinants of the political-economic equilibrium of capitalist societies (see Korpi
and Shalev [40], Korpi [37], [38], Cameron [11], Esping-Andersen [17], Wright [73], Bradley et al. [8]).
The power-resources approach has long been considered one of the ... main theoretical approaches
in the literature on welfare state development(Bradley et al. [8], p.193) and in comparative political
economy. The empirical literature has indeed shown that various measures of working class power
in the labour market (e.g., unionization, labour law, collective bargaining institutions), in the work-
place (e.g., work councils, co-determination) and in the political sphere (e.g., strong Labour parties,
participation of the Left to cabinets, political institutions) explain a signicant part of cross-national
di¤erences in the structure and development of welfare states (Korpi [37], [38], Esping-Andersen [17],
Kangas [30], Bradley et al. [8]) and even some important macroeconomic outcomes, such as ination
and unemployment (Cameron [11]).15
14Our analysis focuses mostly on the relation between macro variables. For a thorough discussion of the microfoun-
dations of a power-centered account of class conict and distribution, see Wright ([73]) and Korpi ([38]).
15The emphasis on working class power has recently been criticised by the varieties of capitalism approach, which
has provided an alternative explanation of welfare state development focusing on the role of rms and on workers
investment in skills (Hall and Soskice [25]). This debate is important but not directly relevant to our analysis. For in
this paper we do not aim to adjudicate between di¤erent theories of the welfare state. Nor are we trying to provide a
explanation of cross-national di¤erences in welfare state development. Our key claim is that power resources are among
the main determinants of long-run income distribution, but they are not necessarily the only ones (Bradley et al. [8],
pp.193-5; see also Iversen [27] for an interesting attempt to reconcile the power resource and the varieties of capitalism
approaches). We should note, however, that in a time-series - rather than cross-sectional - perspective, a focus on
power resources rather than, for example, skills, seems quite natural. Moreover, whereas skills may be a determinant of
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At a theoretical level, however, the power resources approach is not limited to the analysis of
social spending and government policies, and it can be interpreted as a general framework to analyse
class relations and distributive conicts. In the power resources approach attention is focused on the
assets, or power resources, which actors bring into distributive conicts and, if necessary, can bring
to bear in asserting their interests (Korpi and Palme [39], p.427). From this perspective, the main
actors in the economy are expected to organize for collective action in political parties and unions to
modify conditions for and outcomes of market distribution(Korpi [38], p.173, italics added). That
is, classes use their power resources both to alter income distribution in the short-run, given a certain
structure of trade-o¤s, and perhaps more importantly, to modify the structure of trade-o¤s in the
long-run.
In the empirical analysis below, we consider trade union density as the key measure of the bar-
gaining strength of the working class. From a theoretical viewpoint, unionization may be seen as the
primary organization form of the working class and can thus be considered a basis for other forms of
working class strength(Rothstein [60], p.33). Arguably, the key dimension of workerspower lies pre-
cisely in their ability to act collectively as a class, and unionization is the most basic form of workers
collective organization both in the labour market and in the workplace - the fundamental dimension
of their associational power(Wright [73], p.962. See also Korpi and Palme [39]). Further, measures
of trade union density capture working class strength better than indices of strike activity (such as
number of stoppages and working days lost): there is no clear relation between conict, or militancy,
and organizational strength, because strength, or power is a property, not an act and powerful actors
often do not need to use it. Unionization correctly measures labours collective power resources, not
their use (Korpi and Shalev [40], Cameron [11]) and it is considered as a causally important variable
in the analysis of distribution and distributive conict in a number of approaches across the social
sciences (see, inter alia, Masters and Robertson [45], Freeman [19], Gustafsson and Johansson [22],
Alderson and Nielsen [1], Iversen [27]).16
Second, our analysis focuses primarily on distributive outcomes rather than on welfare state provi-
sions and redistributive policies. In this context, measures of the bargaining power of the working class
earnings inequalities, it is not obvious that they can explain the dynamics of class shares over time.
16We do not distinguish unionism in the private sector from unionism in the public sector on both theoretical and
historical grounds. Theoretically, we do not regard the state as a referee between contending classes but as an active
participant in that struggle. While the precise nature and timing of that participation is historically contingent, the
state is not above class struggle. Historically, as we outline in Section 7, unionism in the public sector (nationalized
industries, other public corporations and general government) was a very important contributory factor to working class
bargaining strength in the UK.
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are arguably more focal. Indeed, in empirical studies of pre-tax income distribution, other measures
of working class power often turn out to be insignicant after controlling for unionization (see, e.g.,
Bradley et al. [8], pp.216¤.). Third, from the econometric viewpoint, many of the variables used in
cross-national studies are hardly useful for our time series analysis: indices measuring the structure of
collective bargaining or employment protection, or variables capturing the existence of work councils
vary very little, if at all, for very long periods of time within any given country.
In a two-class bargaining framework, however, what matters is the balance of power between the
main protagonists. The key power resource of employers are economic assets, or capital (Korpi [38]),
but the extent to which ownership of economic assets translates into power depends on a number
of factors, and in particular on capitalistscapacity to control investment and the options available
to them. Indeed, the major di¤erence in the power resources available to capitalists and workers
is precisely that, unlike human capital, economic resources can be divested and transferred (Korpi
[38]), and the actual mobility of capital depends both on technological factors and on the broader
legal, political, and institutional framework. From this perspective, the openness of an economy is a
key determinant of the power of employers and so of distributive outcomes and redistributive policies
(Scharpf [62], Wright [73], Bradley et al. [8], Korpi and Palme [39]).
In the econometric analysis below, we capture openness by focusing on capital ows in and out
of the country, consistent with the emphasis on capital as the main power resource of capitalists.
Increased capital mobility (in both directions) tends to increase the capacity of capitalists to control
investment and the allocation of capital. International capital ows (in both directions) provide a
direct measure of the extent to which, in their relation to workers (and the nation state), capitalists
can choose exitas opposed to voice, and hence measures their incentive to nd a compromise in
distributive conicts.17 Other measures of openness used in the literature, such as intensity of trade
or population ows, only indirectly capture the e¤ect of openness on the power relations between
classes, and the empirical evidence suggests that they may be more relevant to explain some of the
income inequalities within the working class (for example, by their e¤ect on skill di¤erentials; Borjas
[7], Wood [72], Richardson [58], Gustafsson and Johansson [22], Alderson and Nielsen [1]) rather than
income distribution between classes (Boggio et al. [6]).
It may be argued that what matters are the restrictions (or lack thereof) on capital mobility, rather
17Some authors focus only on capital outows (see, e.g. Alderson and Nielsen [1]), but this can only partially capture
the freedom of movement of capital, and so changes in capitalistsbargaining power.
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than mobility itself. However, measures of openness focusing on legal and institutional restriction on
capital mobility have three problems. First, at the theoretical level, formal legal and institutional
restrictions do not really capture all of the factors a¤ecting capital mobility. Second, even if there
are no juridical restraints to capital movement, there may be other sources of frictions (such as an
insistence on product standards). And third, capital mobility depends not only on national laws but
on the overall international framework. At the empirical level, indices of capital restrictions are rather
imperfect and although they provide some insight in cross-national analysis, they are inadequate in a
time-series framework.
In line with the power resources approach, we suppose that increases in the power resources of one
class have long-lasting positive e¤ects on the share of income that goes to that class. Thus, contrary
to SDT, in the long-run we expect union strength to be positively associated with the equilibrium
wage share, whereas capital mobility should be negatively associated with both the wage share and
the employment rate.18 In line with the ndings in section 2 above, and with a standard prot squeeze
mechanism, we also expect to nd evidence of a short-run cyclical relation between the wage share
and the employment rate.
In the next section we test whether there exist interaction and a common dynamic between wage
share, employment rate, an openness measure and trade union density variables in the UK over nearly
ve decades, by using a vector error correction model.
6 Distributive conict in the UK: an econometric analysis
We use annual data (described in Appendix A). Owing to data limitation on capital movements, the
analysis starts in t = 1966 and ends in t = 2010; comprising 45 yearly observations, which allows us
to study the long-run properties of the data (Hakkio and Rush [24], p.572). At time t, our data are
represented as a column vector of four variables, yt, comprising measures of wage share, employment
rate, trade union density and openness. For any t, let yt = yt   yt 1 denote the change in the four
variables between period t and period t  1.
The dynamics of the wage share (wt) and employment rate (et) were described in Figure 3 and are
reported again in Figure 6 Panel (a) (left scale), for ease of comparison. The openness of the economy
18Using a cross-country panel, Jayadev [28] shows a robust negative correlation between the degree of openness and
labours share in national income.
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Figure 6: The Pattern of the Main Economic Variables, UK, 1966-2010
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(ot) is measured by the sum of inward and outward foreign direct investment over gross xed capital
formation. The dynamics of ot is depicted in Figure 6 Panel (a) (right scale) and shows a steady
increase since the early 1980s, from just above 1.3% to over 8%. Finally, Figure 6 Panel (b) depicts
the trade union density variable (the ratio of trade union membership to employee jobs) measured
in levels (ut; left scale) and in di¤erences (ut; right scale). Over 41% of the workforce belonged
to a trade union in 1966, which rose to nearly 54% at the end of the 1970s but decreased steadily
thereafter. In 2010 only one out of four in the workforce was unionized. The change of trade union
density (ut) has been very unstable, but clearly decreasing for the rst fteen years of our data and
progressively moving closer to zero thereafter.
Visual inspection of the time pattern of all variables suggests that they are nonstationary. We
investigate whether the single processes have a unit root by using the modied DickeyFuller t test,
including a linear trend (Elliott et al. [16]),19 and conclude that the wage share (wt), the employment
rate (et) and the openness indicator (ot) are integrated of order 1, while trade union density (ut)
is integrated of order 2.20 Thus, given our interest in detecting the short-run dynamics and the
long-run interaction between them, we estimate a cointegrated vector auto-regressive model with lag
p (VAR(p)) written as a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).21 We dene the multivariate vector
yt = (wt; et; ot;ut)
0 and estimate the following VECM representation of the VAR(p):
yt =
p 1X
j=1
 jyt j +AByt 1 + vt (1)
where vt is a sequence of independently and identically distributed shocks, with zero mean and full
rank variance-covariance matrix; p is the nite number of lags considered;  j is the 4  4 matrix
capturing the short-term interactions among the variables of interest; B is the r  4 cointegrating
matrix (with rank r, also known as the cointegrating rank) which captures the long-run relations
between the variables; and A is the 4  r matrix capturing the link between short-run and long-run
19This is an augmented DickeyFuller test, where the time series is transformed via a generalised least squares
regression before performing the test. It has signicantly greater power than the previous versions of the augmented
DickeyFuller test.
20Using asymptotic econometric theory, bounded variables  such as shares  cannot be nonstationary. However,
using the linear model as a reasonable approximation of the true process and considering that also shares that are
relatively distant from the boundaries can have nonstationary properties in nite samples, one can analyse their long-
run statistical properties using cointegration methods. In fact, there exists a vast empirical economic literature analysing
the dynamics of bounded variables with cointegration models, such as interest rates, which cannot be negative, exchange
rates uctuating within a bandwidth, and unemployment rates. For an advanced theoretical analysis of limited time
series with unit roots, see Cavaliere ([13]).
21The econometric methodology adopted is explained in detail in Appendix B.
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dynamics by expressing the e¤ects of deviations from the long-run equilibrium, Byt 1, on the short
term dynamics, yt. Given the cointegrating rank r, simultaneous estimation of  j ; A and B can
be obtained using the full information maximum likelihood framework (Johansen [29]). In order to
investigate the number of lags p in the model, we use Schwarzs Bayesian information criterion and a
series of specication tests, which suggest estimating a VAR(1). This is not surprising given the yearly
frequency of our data and also advisable in order to keep the model as parsimonious as possible.22
Consistent with the pattern of the series under analysis, we assume a model with only a constant
and no deterministic trend in the cointegrating equation, and estimate the cointegrating rank by
iterating the cointegration test starting from r = 0. Table 1 shows the trace test.
Table 1: Johansen rank test
max. rank (r) param. Log-likel. eigenvalue statistic 5% crit. value
Trace test
0 4 -216.251 89.338 47.21
1 11 -194.441 0.637 45.719 29.68
2 16 -175.694 0.582 8.225 15.41
3 19 -172.901 0.122 2.638 3.76
Notes: The null hypothesis of the trace test is that the that there are no
more than r cointegrating relations in the VECM.
Constant included in the model. Observations: 40. Lags: 1
We reject the hypotheses that r = 0 and r = 1, but we do not reject the hypothesis that r = 2, and
so conclude that there are two cointegrating relationships.
Assuming the presence of two cointegrating equations, we next check that the residuals of the
estimated VECM are not subject to signicant heteroskedasticity. Letting r = 2, A and B0 are 4 2
matrices, where as noted above A captures the e¤ects of deviations from the long-run equilibrium
Byt 1. The estimated VECM with p = 1 can then be written as:
yt = bA bByt 1 + bvt: (2)
Table 2 gives estimates of the two cointegrating equations B, estimating the long-run relationships,
and of the error correction matrix A, estimating the e¤ect of deviations from long-run equilibrium on
the four variables in yt. Because Byt 1 is stationary, shocks a¤ecting these relationships have only a
temporary e¤ect, and Byt 1 can be seen as a long-run equilibrium.
22Lutz ([42]) demonstrates that choosing the lag order to minimize Schwarzs Bayesian information criterion or the
Hannan and Quinn information criterion provides consistent estimates of the true lag order.
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Table 2: Estimated VECM. yt = A^B^yt 1 + v^t; yt = (wt; et; ot;ut)0
Cointegrating equations (matrix B^):
CE1 CE2
wt 1 1.000(b) 0.583
(0.200)
et 1 0.000(a) 1.000(b)
ot 1 0.454 0.000(a)
(0.114)
ut 1 -1.779 -5.649
(0.223) (0.596)
Error Correction (matrix A^):
wt et ot 
2ut
CE1 -0.464 -0.390 -0.091 0.000(a)
(0.110) (0.089) (0.033) (0.000)
CE2 0.206 0.068 0.029 0.180
(0.045) (0.037) (0.014) (0.025)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (a) indicates
the restriction imposed; (b) indicates the normalisa-
tion imposed. LR test statistics: 0.023 (5% critical
value, 3.841)
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As we have no a priori theoretical restrictions to impose, we test the model with all variables
included, normalizing to unity the coe¢ cients of the wage share and the employment rate in the rst
and second cointegrating equations respectively.23 The coe¢ cients of the employment rate in the
rst equation and of openness in the second are both statistically insignicant, and so we test the
assumption that they are jointly equal to zero by using the likelihood ratio (LR) test. The likelihood
ratio test statistic is 0:023, which is well below the chi-squared 5% critical value of 3:841 for one degree
of freedom, allowing us not to reject the restrictions imposed.24 This result is also presented at the
bottom of Table 2.
Using the estimated coe¢ cients of bB, and including the estimated constant, the two cointegrating
equations (CE) can be written as:
CE1: wt = 70:32  0:45
(0:12)
ot + 1:78
(0:22)
ut + bv1t
CE2: et = 124:41  0:58
(0:20)
wt + 5:65
(0:60)
ut + bv2t ; (3)
with estimated standard errors in parentheses.
CE1 suggests that, in the long run, trade union density and wage share are positively correlated
(if the change of trade union density increases by one percentage point, the wage share increases by
1.78 percentage points), and openness and wage share are negatively correlated (if openness increases
by one percentage point, the wage share decreases by 0.45 percentage points). CE2 suggests that in
the long run the wage share and the employment rate are negatively correlated (an increase of the
wage share by one percentage point decreases the employment rate by nearly 0.6 percentage points)
and the change in union density and the employment rate are positively correlated (an increase in
the change in union density by one percentage point increases the employment rate by 5.6 percentage
points).
In other words, in the long-run, the dynamics of the wage share and of the employment rate are
signicantly correlated to the dynamics of other variables, namely openness and trade union density
change, and the signs of the relevant coe¢ cients coincide with the hypotheses set out in section 5.
Although the coe¢ cients of CE1 and CE2 should be interpreted with care, given that the estimation
methods do not allow us to make precise statements about causality, these results show that an
23Johansens ([29]) maximum likelihood estimation methods require some normalisation restrictions, which is why
the coe¢ cients of the wage share and of the employment rate are set equal to unity in CE1 and in CE2, respectively.
24Throughout the analysis we use a critical value of 5%.
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increase in the power resources of workers, proxied by the change of the trade union density measure,
is correlated to a long-run increase in the wage share and the employment rate. An increase in the
power resources of capitalists, as measured by international capital mobility, is correlated to a long-
run decrease in the wage share. Further, in the long-run, an increase in the wage share is negatively
correlated with employment. These results validate the power resources approach while raising serious
doubts about SDT and in particular the assumption of a dollar-for-dollar relationship between wage
share and employment rate. For an increase in the power resources of a class tends to modify the
long-run income distribution in favour of that class.
The analysis of the estimated error correction matrix ( bA) allows us to rule out the hypothesis
that some of the variables included are (weakly) exogenous because no variable has zero estimated
correction coe¢ cients in both cointegrating equations. Estimated coe¢ cients of the rst cointegrated
equation (CE1) suggest that when the wage share is above its equilibrium level, the wage share quickly
reacts reducing its value, (ba1;1 =  0:46), and openness decreases (ba1;3 =  0:09), while there is no
e¤ect on the short-term dynamics of the change of trade union density, ut. If a positive deviation
from the long-run equilibrium of the employment rate equation (CE2) occurs, the employment rate
increases (ba2;2 = 0:07), the change in trade union density quickly increases (ba2;4 = 0:18), possibly
because of the increased employment rate, and openness of the economy also increases (ba2;3 = 0:03).
The values of the parameters ba1;2 and ba2;1 are of particular interest for our analysis, because they
support the existence of the short-run prot squeeze cycles identied in section 2 above. For if the wage
share is above its long-run equilibrium level, the demand for labour decreases and the employment
rate with it (ba1;2 =  0:39), and vice versa when the wage share is below the equilibrium. Further, if
the employment rate rises above its long-run equilibrium level, the wage share quickly reacts upward
(ba2;1 = 0:21), and vice versa when the employment rate is below the equilibrium. These ndings are
consistent with a prot squeeze mechanism, and with the clockwise motion of WSER cycles.
As all variables in vector yt are endogenous, we analyse long- and short-run dynamics jointly,
simulating the orthogonalized impulse response function (IRF), which traces out the response of
current and future values of each of the variables to a one time unit increase in the current value of
only one of the errors at a time, holding everything else constant. We use the Cholesky factorization
of the residuals covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses, ordering the variables as follows:
ot, ut, wt, et, i.e., introducing rst those variables that seem to react less quickly to shocks in the
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multivariate model. In Figure 7, each diagram plots the response of each variable ot, ut, wt and et
to a Cholesky standard deviation shock of itself and the other three variables for a time lag that goes
from 1 to 10 years.
Summing up the main ndings, Figure 7 shows that a one standard deviation shock on the openness
indicator (ot) has a permanent negative e¤ect on the wage share (see Responses of w to o), while a
similar shock on the change of trade union density has initially a negative e¤ect on the wage share,
which becomes positive after the fourth period and remains positive thereafter (see Responses of w
to u). The employment rate does not respond to a shock of the openness index (see Responses of
e to o) but it increases in the long-run after a positive shock of the change of trade union density
(see Responses of e to u). In general, with a couple of exceptions, a shock in one of the variables
considered has a permanent e¤ect on the others.
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions (Cholesky Decomposition, Shocks of 1 Standard Deviation)
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We assessed the robustness of our results in several ways.25 First of all, we used alternative
measures of trade union density, namely (a) the revision by Bailey and Kelly ([2]) excluding non-UK
citizens, retired people, the unemployed, the self-employed from the o¢ cial gures and (b) the series
produced by Visser ([69]), which is the standard for cross-sectional analysis among di¤erent countries.
They all suggest that trade union density increased at a decreasing rate up to the end of the 1970s,
then declined by nearly 5% per year between mid 1980s and mid 1990s (hence decreasing but at a
more moderate rate). Our main empirical conclusions remain unaltered regardless of the measure
of trade union density used. Similarly, no signicant change emerges if the measure of trade union
density (the ratio of trade union members to employee jobs) used is replaced with the ratio of trade
union members to workforce jobs or with ratios that include the unemployment benet claimant count
in the denominator. As alternative measures of workersbargaining power, we also used the number
of working days lost and the number of stoppages in a year, and conrmed results obtained with trade
union density measures (actually increasing the statistical signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients).
The key results of our econometric analysis continue to hold if, instead of the change in union density,
we use the level of the unionization variable, but the properties of the residuals are less satisfactory
from an econometric perspective.
Second, we ran a set of robustness checks involving the use of di¤erent variables to measure
capitalistsbargaining power, such as the sum of inward and outward foreign direct investment over
GDP but results were virtually unchanged. Indeed, we have also estimated the model without the
openness variable, which allows us to obtain a longer time series. Unsurprisingly, the explanatory
power of the model decreases, but the key insight on the importance of the bargaining power of the
working class remains true.
Last but not least, we have also analysed the two key variables of our model, the wage share and
the employment relation in isolation and the results are unambiguous, and in contradiction with SDT:
quite strikingly, there exists no long-run cointegrating relationship between wt and et, either in the
restricted sample 1966-2010 or in the full sample 1950-2010. The two variables are cointegrated only
if at least another variable - openness and/or trade union density, in our analysis - is added.
As a nal comment on our empirical results, both the denition and the substance of causality
in time series analysis are vexed questions, which is why many studies, especially when looking at
the inuence of political variables on income distribution, do not determine causality, and focus only
25Results are available from the authors upon request.
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on correlations (e.g. Cameron [11], and the studies cited in Bradley et al. [8], p.198). But although
the empirical analysis does not allow us to make any denite claim about causality, we believe that
it provides sound evidence for questioning the dollar-for-dollar relationship between wage share and
employment rate suggested by SDT. We now turn to a narrative account of the long run, to put some
historical esh on the bones of this econometric analysis.
7 The changing conditions of class struggle in the UK
The capitalism that emerged from depression and war was a much more regulated capitalism than
had been the case prior to the war years. New international nancial institutions were created to
encourage the development of multilateral trade, and currency and credit were heavily regulated
both at international and national levels. Alongside commitments to full employment, extensive
social protection systems were put in place, and the state took an active role in scal and industrial
activity. As world trade recovered, historically low levels of unemployment and buoyant demand were
associated with a post-war investment boom, and norms of consumerism were established on the basis
of expectations of rising living standards, exemplied by the growth of mass markets for consumer
durables.26
While the UK shared in the general prosperity of the metropolitan capitalist world through the
1950s and 1960s, its performance in terms of productivity and growth was rather less impressive than
most other developed capitalist economies. While there were characteristics of European capitalist
economies (such as large agricultural populations) that the UK did not share contemporaneously
(because of its earlier industrialization), there were also two features peculiar to the historical evolution
of the UK economy. The rst concerns the general international orientation of UK capital, and the
second the position of organized labour.27
7.1 The orientation of UK capital
In the years after 1945 the UK lined up as the junior partner of the USA in a special relationship
with the aim of preserving as much as it could of its pre-war imperial heritage in the face of both
26Hence the resonance of the phrase youve never had it so good, a slogan of the US Democratic Party in the 1952
Presidential election campaign and reworked in a July 1957 speech by Harold Macmillan (...most of our people have
never had it so good). [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3728000/3728225.stm]
27The following account builds on some of the prescient account presented by Purdy [55] and [56].
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reduced capacity and independence movements in its colonies. With continental rivals incapacitated
by defeat and destruction, this was initially a successful policy, but it entailed signicant costs in
three respects. First, despite its heavy indebtedness arising from the war, the UK retained a defence
budget (with a signicant East of Suezcomponent) that was much larger than its European rivals.
Second, while the preservation of the Sterling Area continued the Citys role as a nancial centre,
it also elevated defence of an overvalued exchange rate to a shibboleth of economic policy for some
two decades. And third, the indicative planning as a peacetime inheritance from the war economy
proceeded in a somewhat haphazard and disorganized manner: the nationalized industries were never
coordinated with one another and never used as signicant instruments of industrial policy; indeed,
Cold War rhetoric disavowed planning as undemocratic.
This orientation meant that the UK was not involved in the formation of the institutions which
were to become the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. But once the economies of
continental rivals had recovered from the war, it was not obvious that an imperial and post-colonial
reach was preferable to a serious engagement with continental Europe. Following the veto of the 1956
Anglo-French Suez adventure by the US, and the exposure of the special relationshipas rather less
than two-way, the UK applied to join the EEC in 1961 but was vetoed by France in 1963. Part of the
reason for the veto was the continued existence of the Sterling Area and its implications for exchange
rate stability within the EEC Commonwealth members kept sterling balances in London (often the
result of Imperial wartime loans to the UK) and UK interest rates had to be high enough so as not
to cause any signicant outow. After rejection of its application to join the EEC, political drift
then followed for a decade. But in 1958 the dismantling of exchange controls began, and through the
1960s the debt nancing of both US domestic social programmes and the US war in Vietnam led to
substantial o¤-shore Eurodollar dealings in which the City of London proved important.28 While the
pooled reserves of the Sterling Area had been useful in the dollar shortage of the late 1940s, dollar
shortages had long ceased to apply, so that the Sterling Area balances could be wound down as the
prerequisite for a renewed attempt to join the EEC. Joining was nally achieved in 1972-3, just as the
golden ageended.
The 1970s drift away from a managed Keynesianism towards a deregulated neoliberalism was hard
to combine with a wholehearted commitment to a neo-corporatist EEC and its social market under-
28The 1960s Eurodollars (and other eurocurrencies) were held o¤shore from their original domicile; the etymology is
unfortunate, for they had nothing to do with the much later euro.
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pinnings. Relations with the EEC in the 1980s were dominated by UK resentment and renegotiations
over the nancial commitments that were entailed by membership, and then by the negotiations
over the Single European Act of 1986 followed by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Insofar as these
treaties revolved around the single market, they were supported by the UK, but as these treaties
also presaged and developed extra-economic processes of integration, the UKs attitude ranged from
ambiguous support to outright hostility, particularly towards anything that might be interpreted as
support for Franco-German proposals for greater political integration.
Commitment to the EEC required a serious attempt to modernize UK industry, but the 1970s
retreat from even a weak form of social democracy ensured that this did not happen. After the
Conservatives took o¢ ce in 1979, deregulation was pursued enthusiastically: in 1979, all exchange
controls were abolished, and in 1986 the City was opened to US capital by abolishing the institutional
separation of stockjobbing from stockbroking, retail from wholesale banking, and commercial from
merchant banks. As the City rose to pre-eminence as a major nancial centre of the world, its
orientation to nancialization within a world market took precedence over any modernization of the
UKs industrial structure, and deregulated markets condemned the latter (apart from certain niche
areas) to low investment, low productivity and low wages.
These developments are captured in the openness index depicted in Figure 6 Panel (a) (right scale).
The index initially changed little between 1966 and 1980, averaging 1.4 (with a standard deviation of
0.0396). The removal of capital controls saw an immediate jump in the index from 1.4 in 1980 to 1.7
the following year. It then climbed to 1.9 in the mid-1980s and 2.1 by the end of the decade. The
e¤ects of the deregulation of the 1980s were amplied further in the 1990s, and the index rose from
2.1 in 1990 to 5.7 in 2000 and 8.2 in 2010. This 518% increase over the whole period had a signicant
long run e¤ect. The increasing openness of the UK economy, despite an initial ambivalence of UK
capital as to its orientation, gave an outside option to capital in struggles over the wage bargain, and
the lack of modernization amplied that e¤ect by making closure and relocation, outsourcing and
so forth easier. In terms of class struggle, the outside option signicantly tilted the balance towards
capital in the wage bargain.
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7.2 The position of organized labour
Perhaps because it was the original capitalist economy, with a deep historical commitment to laissez-
faire, the historical development of trade unionism in the UK was quite peculiar compared with that
in later developing capitalist economies. Prior to the 1970s, statutory legislation was conspicuous by
its absence. There was no legislation compelling employers to bargain with trade unions, no legislation
that made collective agreements legally enforceable, no legislation concerning either workersrights to
join a trade union or employer recognition of unionization, and no legal right collectively to withdraw
labour and hence to strike. Because English common law, based on judicial opinion over the centuries,
had evolved to protect the rights of the individual, it was hostile to any action that interfered with
contract and property rights. Such interferences were torts, and those so interfered with could seek
punitive legal redress (with e¤ectively a judicial guarantee of success). Hence because any collective
action by organized labour was a restraint of trade, in common law trade unionism was impossible.
The only way to nullify this was both to exempt trade unions from liability in tort, and to protect
individual organizers of trade union activity from torts concerning trade disputes. This was the e¤ect
of the 1906 Trades Disputes Act, and it was the sole legal basis for trade unionism until the 1970s.
There was indeed a raft of legislation in the 1960s and 1970s establishing individual rights for workers:
minimum notice periods for employees (1963), minimum redundancy payments (1967), protection
against unfair dismissal (1971), protection in case of accidents (1974), extensions of workersstatutory
rights (1975 and 1978), and protection against discrimination on grounds of sex (1970 and 1975) and
race (1976), together with a system of industrial tribunals before which breaches of individual rights
could be brought. But these were not the collective rights of trade unionism. The latter only existed
by virtue of the 1906 immunity from torts arising out of restraint of trade.
For this reason, the development of trade unionism in the public sector was especially important.
Dating back to 1918, freedom of association and organization had been conceded in the public sector,
together with fair wages policies whose e¤ect was to compel private sector employers either to
recognize trade unions or to pay the going rate (and by the late 1940s a quarter of the employed
labour force was covered by wage levels administered by wages councils). While trade unionism
was actively encouraged in the public sector, nevertheless the inter-war depression had mitigated its
spread and e¤ects. In the golden age in the 25 years after 1945, this was no longer true. The
wave of nationalizations after 1945 in mining, utilities, transport and communications, in pursuit of a
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modernization that the inter-war private sector had demonstrated that it could not deliver, together
with the expansion of public sector health, social services, housing and education, encouraged the
spread of public sector trade unionism.29 And post-war growth also boosted trade unionism in private
sector manufacturing. Outside of private sector manufacturing and the expanded public sector, trade
unionism was weaker; it was the historically low levels of unemployment, combined with a large public
sector, that made trade unionism appear stronger that it in fact was (but this was not evident until
the 1980s). As shown in Figure 6 Panel (b) (left scale), overall trade union density peaked in 1978 at
53.8%; in 1980 it was still 51.6%.
With the low unemployment of the golden age, the problemof organized labour was identied
as its apparent ability to lead a wage-price inationary spiral through wage demands in excess of
productivity increases. Three approaches to resolving this issue were attempted. The rst was to
incorporate trade unions in some form of corporatist agreement around an incomes policy. The
second was to alter the legislative framework to which trades unions were subject. The third was to
manage the economy at higher levels of unemployment. These three approaches were not alternatives,
and they received varying emphases at various times in the decades after the 1950s. After a hesitant
experiment with a timid corporatism (through the National Economic Development Council) in the
early 1960s, the remainder of the 1960s saw attempts at an incomes policy, the voluntary adherence
to which was intended to be bought by policies of fairnesstowards both incomes and prices. But the
unions never wholeheartedly signed up to the policy, particularly at grass roots level where the prices
part of the policy was seen as merely a cover for the implementation of wage restraint. Recourse was
additionally made to higher levels of unemployment (also necessitated by the deationary policies
required to make a success of the 1966 sterling devaluation). The increase in unemployment appeared
large at the time (the claimant count unemployment rate was around 1.5% in the mid-60s and 2.5%
in 1970 as international demand conditions remained buoyant), but proved too small to have much
impact. With neither incomes policies nor rising unemployment seeming to work, towards the end of
the 1960s proposals were made to alter the legislative framework governing trade union activity, but
the (Labour) government was divided, and the proposals came to nothing. By 1970 then, all three
approaches to trades unions had been attempted. But none had had great success, and the di¢ culties
that organized labour posed for capital remained unresolved.
29 In 1980, for example, trade union density among full-time employees of nationalized industries was 97% and of
general government 89% (cited by Pencavel [49] p. 191).
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These di¢ culties deepened in the rst half of the 1970s at the same time as the golden agecame to
an end. The Conservative Government of 1970-74 attempted to alter the legislative framework, but the
imprisonment of trade unionists did not prove popular, and an unwise confrontation with the unions,
particularly with the National Union of Mineworkers, triggered a who governs?general election which
the Conservative Government lost in 1974.30 Cooperation was then tried again, but the circumstances
were not propitious. For the post-war conditions that had underpinned the use of Keynesian policies
of demand management had evaporated. Comparing 1975-79 with 1965-69, the average (claimant
count) unemployment rate had almost doubled from 2.0% to 3.8%, and the average (Retail Prices
Index) ination rate had almost quadrupled from 4.3% to 15.6%. With such stagation, capital
was split between industrial interests whose representatives wanted an expansionary scal policy and
an accommodative monetary policy to boost demand in the face of falling protability, and nancial
interests whose representatives wanted a deationary scal policy and a restrictive monetary policy
to increase real interest rates. This played out in policy terms as a Keynesian-Monetarist controversy
in which the Monetarist approach was increasingly ascendant, and the abandonment of the Keynesian
approach was denitively announced in Prime Minister Callaghans 1976 speech to the Labour Party
Conference.
Against this background successive Labour Governments (1974-79) attempted a more corporatist
approach, involving a social contractin exchange for an incomes policyin an attempt to toughen
the incomes policy stance that had been adopted in the 1960s. But because protability had collapsed,
a successful incomes policy entailed straightforward wage restraint. Under these stresses, the social
contract of the mid-70s disintegrated in a revolt of the low paid (after three years of wage restraint)
in a winter of discontent, and the general election of 1979 resulted in a Conservative government
committed to the abandonment of any sort of corporatism, the reduction of the size of the public
sector, deregulation and a vigorous anti-union legislative agenda. The period between the early 1970s
and the end of the decade was thus a period of transition from the social democracy of the golden
ageto the era of neoliberalism and globalization.
In the 1980s the UK (along with the US) was a prominent cheerleader for the neoliberal approach.
The deationary policies pursued had an immediate e¤ect on the manufacturing sector. This was
30 It is clearer in retrospect that the reasons for the legislative failure (compared with what was to occur a decade
later) were partly a lack of piecemeal gradualism, partly trade union solidarity in resistance, and partly a government
panic at the consequences of rising unemployment, culminating in a policy U-turn by Chancellor of the Exchequer
Barber and a dash for growth.
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partly because a rise in the trade-weighted exchange rate rendered much of manufacturing uncom-
petitive; as a percentage of domestic demand, manufacturing imports were 26% in 1980 and 45%
in 1995. It was also partly because of the ways in which labour-saving new technologies a¤ected a
number of sectors (notably printing, newspapers, shipping and stevedoring). Hence the traditional
strength of trade unionism in manufacturing was undermined by an intensication of product market
competition.
The collapse of manufacturing in turn increased unemployment. As illustrated in Figure 3, the
employment rate dropped very sharply. Compared with an average (claimant count) unemployment
rate of 3.9% in the 1975-79 period, unemployment averaged almost double that rate over the next 15
years: 8.3% over 1980-84, 8.7% over 1985-89 and 8.2% over 1990-94.31
With this backdrop of a collapse in manufacturing and a dramatic increase in normal unem-
ployment, there was a state-sponsored assault on the institutions of organized labour. Partly, this
was indirect, and took a number of forms. Privatizations reduced the size of the public sector, the
headcount employment in nationalized industries falling from 1.85 million in 1979 to 0.72 million
a decade later, and to 0.23 million in 1997 (MacGregor [43] Table D). State-sponsored support of
collective bargaining was reversed, with the elimination of procedures that had extended the e¤ects
of industry-wide collective agreements to non-unionized private sector rms. The powers of wages
councils to set wage oors were reduced in 1986, and wages councils themselves were abolished in
1993.32 In 1988, local authorities were forced to allow competitive tendering, and were prohibited
from specifying minimum standards.33 And decentralized pay bargaining was actively encouraged by
the state. All of this amounted to a historical reversal of the public sector encouragement of trade
unionism in favour of a state-sponsored active low wages policy in both public and private sectors.
At the same time, there was a direct assault by the state on trade union organization. A succession
of Employment Acts reformedthe trade unions, by restricting (1980 and 1982) and then eliminating
(1988 and 1990) the legal basis for the closed shop, by rendering secondary picketing illegal (1980), by
31The Claimant Count is dened in terms of who is a recipient of unemployment-related benets, and so changes
with changes to the benets system. The series used in this paper is a time-consistent series. For the serious problems
in interpreting the data, especially through the 1980s, where time-consistency eliminates many of the unemployed, see
Gregg [21]. The more internationally accepted (ILO) denition of the unemployment rate only goes back to 1971; it
is on average 1.76 percentage points higher than the claimant count unemployment rate over the period 1971 to 2010
(with a standard deviation of 0.623). The ILO average measures corresponding to the claimant count measures in the
text are 5.3% over 1975-79, 10.2% over 1980-84, 9.8% over 1985-89, and 9.3% over 1990-94.
32Except for the Agricultural Wages Board (whose intended abolition was announced by the Coalition Government in
July 2010). In the early 1980s, the 27 wages councils set legal minimum rates of pay for some 2.7 million workers (Marsh
[44] p. 187). Indeed, in 1980, in rms not covered by collective bargaining, some one third of managers considered that
their manual workerspay was set by wages councils (Pencavel [49] p. 192 and n. 21).
33Competitive tendering was controversially extended to the National Health Service in 2013.
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imposing balloting requirements upon unions (1984, 1988), and, crucially, by partially removing trade
union immunity from torts by successively narrowing the denition of what constituted a legitimate
trade dispute (1980, 1982, 1984 and 1990).34 At the same time, changes were made to the 1971 unfair
dismissal legislation. As regards the individual, virtually all industrial action involves a breach of their
employment contract, rendering that individual liable to immediate termination of employment. Some
legal protection was given to individuals by the 1971 act, and by 1979 employers were protected from
liability for unfair dismissal only if all strike participants were dismissed; employers were liable in cases
of selective dismissal or selective re-engagement. But by 1990, employers were given further immunities
covering selective dismissal and selective re-engagement. In the event of uno¢ cial industrial action,
unions were faced with endorsing the action (opening themselves to damages in tort) or repudiating
the action (in which case they could not defend their members from selective dismissal). While these
reformswere in progress, a conict was provoked with the National Union of Mineworkers in 1985-86,
and state power was used demonstratively to crush the union. And in the following years employers
were not slow to use the new legislation to obtain injunctions and penal damages against (largely
craft-based) unions with pre-entry closed shops (Marsh [44] Tables 4.1-4.3, pp. 86-90.).
The consequences of the transition to neoliberalism were signicant. First, declining union mem-
bership was principally attributable to the failure of unions to gain recognition in rms formed after
1980, particularly in private sector manufacturing. Second, whereas more than four-fths of the work-
force had been covered by collective bargaining and statutory sectoral wage arrangements in 1980, by
1994 just under half the workforce was so covered. The UK thereby moved away from the European
experience, and much closer to the North American situation. Third, the abolition of wages councils
and the statutory minimum pay levels they had set facilitated greater pay dispersion in the lower
part of the wages distribution, a¤ecting not only the traditional low paid sectors (agriculture, retail,
catering) but also the young, and this contributed to wages inequality growing more rapidly in the
UK than in any other developed capitalist economy save the USA. Fourth, by 2010 trade unionism
had only a marginal signicance in the private sector of the economy, and the relentless pressure of
neoliberalism on the public sector threatened its position there.35 And fth, the legal framework
established after 1979 conrmed an underlying assumption of adversarialism and separation of in-
terests in British labour-management relationswhich was only strengthened by the draconian new
34See Marsh [44], Tables 3.2 and 3.3, pp. 77-8.
35This summary is largely drawn from the surveys of Brown et. al. [9] and Pencavel [49] which have further detail
on other aspects (union pay di¤erentials, unionism and productivity, union democracy) not drawn upon here.
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Figure 8: Trend Employment Rate against Trend Wage Share, UK, 1950-2010
legal sanctions made available to employers and the courts(Brown et. al. [9], p.81).
The e¤ects of these consequences on trade union density was not surprising: Figure 6 Panel (b)
(left scale) shows that density fell sharply from 53.85% in 1979 to 41.6% in 1989 and to 31.4% in
1999. By 2010 it had fallen to 27.3%, almost half its 1979 level. The substitution of individual for
collective agreements, the abolition of pay oors, a seriously adverse legislative environment, and more
intense product market competition, taken together meant that the labour movement could take little
advantage of the local improvement in labour market conditions after 1995. Unemployment rates
averaged 5.7% from 1995-99 (ILO 7.2%), 3.1% from 2000-04 (ILO 5.2%) and 3.1% from 2005-09 (ILO
5.9%), but did nothing to facilitate any reversal of the major shift in the balance of power towards
capital that had occurred after 1979.
7.3 A summary
Consider a connected scatter of the trends in wage share and employment rate, depicted in Figure 8.
The long-run movement of the variables can be thought of as depicting changes in their equilibrium
values, after purely erratic or cyclical uctuations are purged from the data. The movement over
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time is clockwise, but the data certainly do not describe random deviations from a stable long-run
equilibrium. We interpret the empirical evidence depicted in Figure 8 as showing that power and
hegemony have played an important role in the determination of the long-run behaviour of the two
variables. While it may be reasonable to assume such factors as bargaining power of social classes,
capitalistspropensity to invest, and technical conditions constant in the short-to-medium run, they
are likely to vary over longer time periods, depending, inter alia, upon changes in institutional factors,
norms and expectations. For this reason there is no cointegrating relationship between wage share and
employment rate taken on their own. A focus on class struggle requires, as we have seen, additional
variables, proxying working class strength by trade union density and capitalist class strength by the
degree of openness.
Then the data in Figure 8 can be partitioned into three periods, matching the historical account
above. The rst period, from 1950 to the mid-70s, was one of comparative labour strength domestically
and imperial decline internationally, with a mean (trend) wage share of 70.8% and a mean (trend)
employment rate of 88.2%. The second period was a decade of transition, roughly the decade from
the mid-70s to the mid-80s, through which the trend employment rate fell monotonically by some
9 percentage points and the trend wage share monotonically by some 4.5 percentage points. The
third period, roughly from the mid-80s to 2010, was one of comparative labour weakness domestically
and increasing nancialization internationally, with a lower mean (trend) wage share of 66.2% and a
(much) lower mean (trend) employment rate of 80.4%.
In short, the long run data do not describe the sort of prot squeeze phenomenon required by the
structural dependence thesis. Rather they vividly portray the long run economic e¤ects of changes in
the social, political, and institutional conditions of class struggle in the UK, which we have described
both econometrically and historically.
8 Conclusions
Przeworski is e¤ective in exposing some problems of naïve visions of the electoral road to socialism,
such as the idea that socialism would automatically emerge from universal su¤rage; that gradual
reforms would be cumulative and inevitably lead to socialism; and that capitalism and representative
democracy are incompatible. This paper does not attempt to prove that a gradual transition to
socialism via the ballot box is indeed feasible, nor that the tactical and strategic choices of social
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democratic parties have historically been optimal. It does not assert that any income distribution is
feasible at any moment of time, nor that the prospects for an electoral socialism/social democracy
pursuing redistributive class policies are good. For there certainly are structural limits to attainable
distributions within capitalist institutions, and the empirical analysis suggests that some form of prot
squeeze is indeed operating at any given point in time. It does argue, however, that strong versions
of the structural dependence thesis based on a prot squeeze mechanism, such as Przeworskis, do
not explain the actual choices and trade-o¤s faced by the labour movement. In sum, the social
democratic model is more undetermined than Przeworski suggests. The real history of class power and
class capitulation has more to o¤er than an abstract story of optimizing forward-looking individuals
subordinating themselves to capitalist rationality.
We close the paper by noting some potential avenues for further research. First, a cursory look
at the related literature on Goodwins ([20]) model suggests that the pattern of the UK data is by
no means exceptional: the analysis of US data in Mohun and Veneziani ([46]) and the scatter plots
for ten OECD countries presented by Harvie ([26]) broadly conrm the stylised facts about income
distribution and distributive conict identied in section 2. Short-run distributive cycles appear
around moving long-run equilibria. A comparative study focusing on the international variability of
income distributions and class compromises might thus provide further insights on SDT and social
democracy.
Second, it is important to investigate the empirical relevance of ideology, hegemony and endogenous
preferences in the determination of distributive outcomes. As argued in section 4, agents are socially
determined, and therefore the battle of ideasmay play an important role in determining the political-
economic equilibrium of a capitalist society. This paper has tried to show the limits of SDT and for this
it is su¢ cient to focus on the structural features of an advanced economy capturing the material power
resources of the two classes. However, in order to analyse the evolution of conict and distribution in
advanced capitalist countries, we need to understand the evolution of the ideological centre of gravity
in the political sphere, and the shifts in hegemony. Empirical studies have thus far focused mostly on
variables capturing the partisan composition of governments. However this only tells part of the story
as it does not capture deeper shifts in hegemony and in the ideological centre of gravity of a society.36
Third, in this paper, we have focused on all employees owing to data limitations, and because,
again, this was su¢ cient to criticize SDT. However, our analysis suggests that the development of
36A very interesting quantitative approach to hegemony and ideology in the UK can be found in Hakhverdian [23].
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a class-based dataset on income distribution should be a primary objective for students of income
distribution and class conict.
A Data sources
Apart from data on trade union membership, and for the wage share data for operatives in Production
Industries, all time series data is electronically available from the O¢ ce for National Statistics at
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/. Each series has a 4 digit identier, as listed below.
In Figures 1, 2, 3 and 8:
The wage share is total compensation of employees (HAEA) divided by the sum of total compensation
of employees (HAEA) and gross operating surplus, whole economy (ABNF).
The employment rate is employee jobs (BCAD) divided by the sum of workforce jobs (DYDA) and
total claimant count (BCJA).
The deviations from trends in Figure 2 and the trends in Figures 3 and 8 are constructed using a loess
lter, formed from a locally weighted least squares regression (Cleveland [15]), using a polynomial of
degree 2 and bandwidth (proportion of data covered) of 0.4.
In Figures 4 and 5:
The wage share is Wages and Salaries of Operatives in Production Industries (mining and quarrying;
manufacturing; and electricity, gas and water supply) divided by Gross Value Added in Production
Industries, both from Business Monitor (Census of Production), PA1002, Table 2, Annual Years [14].
The employment rate is as above.
The trend and deviations from trend are derived from a loess lter using a polynomial of degree 1 and
a bandwidth of 0.3.
In Figure 6:
Openness is the ratio of the sum of outward total foreign direct investment (HBWD) and inward total
foreign direct investment (HBWI) to gross xed capital formation (NPQX).
Trade union density is the ratio of trade union membership to employee jobs (BCAD), where trade
union membership for 1950-1987 is column (1) of Table 1 in Bailey and Kelly [2], and for 1987-2010 is
taken from annual reports of the Certication O¢ cer (http://www.certo¢ ce.org/Publications/Annual-
Reports.aspx). While the Bailey and Kelly data from 1960 to 1987 is taken from the Department of
Employment Gazette for February 1987, there are small di¤erences with the same data more recently
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sourced from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills ([10]). We have ignored this because
our results are so strongly robust to the specication of density.
B Estimation of short- and long-run relations: methodology
This appendix provides a general description of the econometric methodology adopted in the pa-
per, mostly following Lütkepohl and Krätzig [42]. Consider a set of K time series variables, yt =
(y1t; :::; yKt)
0. Using a vector auto-regressive approach (VAR), the dynamic interactions of the vector
components are:
yt =
pX
j=1
jyt j + vt; (4)
where vt = (v1t; :::; vKt)0 is a sequence of independently and identically distributed shocks, with
E(vt) = 0, E(vtv0t) = 
 , with rank(
) = K, p is the nite number of lags and the order of the VAR
model, and j is a K K matrix.
In general, a process such as (4) is stable if the polynomial dened by the determinant of the
autoregressive operator has no roots in and on the complex unit circle, i.e. det(IK  
Pp
j=1 jz
p) 6= 0
for jzj  1, where IK is the K K identity matrix. On the assumption that it has initiated in the
innite past (t = 0;1;2; :::), it generates stationary time series that have time-invariant means,
variances, and covariance structure. If the variables in yt are integrated of order 1 (I(1)) the process
is not stationary, but if they have a common stochastic trend so that there are linear combinations of
them that are I(0), they are cointegrated.
A convenient representation of (4) with cointegrated relations is the Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM):
yt =
p 1X
j=1
 jyt j +yt 1 + vt: (5)
If the V AR(p) process has unit roots, i.e. det(IK  
Pp
j=1 jz
p) = 0 for z = 1; the matrix  =
(IK  
Pp
j=1 j) is singular. If rank() = r, then  can be written as a product of (K  r) matrices
A and B, with rank(A) = rank(B) = r as follows:  = AB0: In a VECM representation, long-
and short-run dynamics are modelled separately and the matrix A is the link between the two, as it
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expresses the e¤ects of deviations from the long-run equilibrium, Byt 1, on the short term dynamics,
yt. The matrices  j express the short-term interactions among the variables of interest.
If the multivariate process yt is not stationary, the shocks may also have permanent e¤ects. Hence,
there may be r nontrivial 1 K vectors i, i = 1; :::; r, such that 0iyt is stationary for all i. In this
case the deviations from the linear relation 0iyt are only temporary, and 
0
iyt is a stable relationship
in the long-run. For all i, the variables in yt with nonzero coe¢ cients in 
0
iyt are then cointegrated
and i is the cointegrating vector and r is the cointegrating rank.
A stationary yt can also be expressed in its Wold moving average representation, i.e. as a function
of the original shocks vt, yt =
P1
j=0	jvt jwhere 	0 = IK and
	s =
sX
j=0
	s jj ; s = 1; 2; ::: (6)
can be computed recursively from the reduced-form coe¢ cients of the VAR in levels in (4). The
coe¢ cient of this representation can be interpreted as reecting the responses to impulses hitting the
system. The (i; j)th elements of the matrices 	s trace out the expected response of yi;t+s to a unit
change in yit holding constant all past values of yt: Since the change in yit given its past is measured
by the innovation vit; the elements of 	s represent the impulse responses of the components of yt
with respect to the vt innovations. In the stationary case, 	s ! 0 as s ! 1, hence the e¤ect of
an impulse vanishes over time. When yt is nonstationary the 	s impulse response matrices can be
computed in the same way as in (6) based on VARs with integrated variables, even though a Wold
representation as such does not exist for nonstationary cointegrated processes. In this case the 	s
may not converge to zero as s ! 1 and some shocks may have permanent e¤ects. As the impulse
responses have been criticized because underlying shocks are not likely to occur in isolation if the
components of ut are instantaneously correlated, orthogonal innovations are preferred by adopting a
Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix. As the ordering of the variables in the vector yt may
produce di¤erent shocks, we followed standard practice of trying various triangular orthogonalizations,
checking the robustness of the results with respect to the ordering of the variables (Lütkepohl and
Krätzig [42], p.167).
As in our analysis yt = (wt; et; ot;ut) is a 4  1 vector, there may be only r  3 nontrivial
cointegrating vectors, which can be stacked in a r 4 cointegrating matrix B with cointegrating rank
r. The cointegrating rank can be estimated using a likelihood-ratio test known as the trace test, whose
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null hypothesis is that there are no more than r cointegrating relations. The method starts testing
r = 0 and accepts as br the rst value of r for which the trace statistic fails to reject the null (Johansen
[29]). Finding the r stable long-run relationships is of interest for the economic interpretation of the
SDT since they provide information concerning the determinants of long-run income distribution. But
it is also important for statistical reasons, for when yt is not stationary, the estimates of the VAR in
(4) and of the IRF are consistent but less e¢ cient, unless integration and cointegration are properly
accounted for.
Given the cointegration rank r, simultaneous estimation of  j ; A and B can be obtained using the
full information maximum likelihood framework (Johansen [29]).
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